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Introduction and summary
Agricultural policies in Japan, Korea and Taiwan for the last 50 years show changes in distortions of agricultural incentives facing producers and consumers across deferent stages of economic development, drawing on longer time-series data available in these three economies than in other developing economies including newly industrialized economies. The analysis of this paper is based on the estimation of degree of distortions for key agricultural products as well as the agricultural sector aggregates for the last 50 years. We also discuss the pattern of agricultural protection and its changes in the three economies and examine the evolution of policies in the light of political economy. During the 50 years of our analysis, Japan, Korea and Taiwan jumped up from the status of low-income or lower-middle-income economies to high-income economies. Therefore, this study is expected to shed lights on the process of how agricultural distortions may change over different stages of economic development.
In the following sections, first we briefly characterize the structure of agriculture in Japan, Korea and Taiwan in the course of economic development. Next, the evolutions of agricultural policies in the three economies are reviewed. Then, distortions to agricultural incentives in Japan, Korea and Taiwan are measured in terms of the total rates of assistance to agricultural output (TRA) which is proposed by Anderson et al. (2006) . Subsequently, we discuss the implications of the estimation results on policy reforms in those three economies and try to draw lessons for less developed economies which are experiencing structural transformation in the course of their economic growth.
Economic development and structural change in agriculture
Economic growth and structural transformation
Agricultural policies, particularly distortion policies, are increasingly related with the process of economic development. As Schultz (1978) identified the two agricultural problems, i.e., "the food problem" and "the farm problem", as underlying the policies to exploit or tax agriculture commonly adopted in low-income countries in contrast to the policies to protect or subsidize agriculture in high-income countries. His hypothesis has been established as a paradigm among agricultural economists as it found supports from several empirical studies (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Hayami 1988; Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1991) . Thus, it is important to see how distortions in agricultural incentives changed in the three economies under investigation over the different stages of economic development. More recently, Hayami and Godo (2004) added "the disparity problem" as a problem specific to middle-income economies. Table 1 shows some indicators of economic development. The first three rows indicate real GDP per capita in 2000 constant prices at purchasing power parity (PPP) in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, which are taken from Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) . In 1955, Japan's GDP per capita was more than $3,000 whereas Korea and Taiwan's was less than $1,500. Japan spurted the economic growth thereafter, reaching $4,500 in 1960 and $5,000 in 1961. Korea and Taiwan stayed at a low level of per capita GDP around $1,500 in 1960. Korea and Taiwan had to wait until the late 1970s or the early 1980s to reach their per capita GDP at a level of $5,000. 1 Japan reached already a level beyond $10,000 in per capita GDP by 1970 but it was the late 1980s or the early 1990s when Korea and Taiwan reached the level of $10,000.
2 Based on the above observations, it is convenient to classify the development of the three economies under investigation into 4 stages by the level of per capita real GDP as follows:
• Low-income stage ($1,500 or less): Before 1950 for Japan and before 1960 for Korea and Taiwan.
• Lower middle-income stage ($1,500-$5,000): 1950-60 for Japan and 1960-80 for Korea and Taiwan.
3
• Upper middle-income stage ($5,000-$10,000): 1960-70 for Japan and 1980-90 for Korea and Taiwan.
• High-income stage ($10,000 or more): After 1970 for Japan and after 1990 for Korea and
Taiwan.
The criteria of classification are not universal but are convenient for the comparison of the economic development in these three economies.
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Changes in other indicators in Table 1 declined to less than 10 percent in the high-income stage. The structural transformation in terms of the labor force share progressed at slower rates than in terms of the GDP share so that the share in labor force is much larger than that in GDP for each economy even in 2004. Overall, in the structural adjustment in shifting labor from agriculture to other sectors, Japan has been about a decade ahead of Taiwan, and Taiwan has been about a decade ahead of Korea.
Roughly speaking, in economic growth and structural transformation Japan has gone ahead of Taiwan in about two decades and ahead of Korea in about two decades and a half, though the gaps have narrowed over time.
Changes in the structures of agriculture
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Among the three economies Japan produced 8.8 trillion yen of agricultural products valued at farm-gate sales and value added of 5.3 trillion yen in 2004. There are 2.6 million workers engaged mainly in agricultural activities from 2.9 million farm households as of 2004.
Agriculture's weight in total economy, however, is declining. The share is 1.1 percent in GDP and 4.1 percent in labor force (Table 1) . It should be noted that the number of workers engaged mainly in agriculture is less than that of farm households. This means that some farm households have no worker engaged mainly in agriculture. Japan's Agricultural Census defines a farm household as one that operates on 10 ares (0.1 hectare) or more of farmland, or annual sales of agricultural products of 150,000 yen (US$1,250 for the exchange rate of 120 yen/$) or more.
Thus, very small units of farm operation in which no full-time worker engages in farm production are classified in the category of farm households. Indeed, full-time farm households in which no family member engaged in non-agricultural employment accounted for only 15 percent of total farm households in 2004.
On the other hand, non-commercial farm households, which operate less than 30 acres of farmland or annual sales of less than 500,000 yen, account for 26 percent of total farm households. Moreover, Type II part-time farm households whose income from non-agricultural sources exceeds agricultural income accounted for a half of total farm households. In Japan farm households maintained 7.4 percent of total population in 2004, which is larger than in Korea, which had 1.24 million farm households with 3.4 million people accounting for 7.1 percent of total Korean population in the same year. In contrast, Taiwan had 0.72 million farm households holding 3.2 million people, which accounted for 14.3 percent of total population in 2004. In 1955, the population in 6 million farm households accounted for 41 percent of total population in Japan, whereas 2.2 million farm households held 62 percent of total population in Korea and 0.73 million farm households held 51 percent of total population in Taiwan, respectively. The number of farm household in Taiwan has been relatively stable.
It is noted that the share of agricultural population (population in farm households) in
Korea had declined at faster rates than in Japan and Taiwan resulting from faster decreases in both the number of farm households and the number of persons per household in the former than the latter. Such contrasts may be explained by the difference in job opportunity in rural areas.
There are a wide range of non-farm job opportunities available in rural areas in Japan and land per farm household resulted from the declines both in arable land area and in the number of farm household in Japan, but the farm-size changes in Korea and Taiwan were mostly resulted from changes in the number of farm households. In Japan and Korea, average farm size increased from 1.0 and 0.9 hectares in 1955 to 1.6 and 1.5 hectares in 2004, respectively, whereas the farm size in Taiwan has remained almost constant during this period.
An important difference is the changes in the commodity mix in farm production. Rice was traditionally the most important crop in these three economies, but the changes in its relative importance were different. In Japan rice has been losing the share in the value of total Taiwan was able to shift agricultural production resources more efficiently than Japan and Korea in response to the shift in demand for more income-elastic commodities.
In the last rows in Table 1 23 percent in 2000 that is lower than that of Japan. The differences in this ratio may reflect the differences in the efficiency in structural adjustment of agriculture among the three economies.
Evolution of agricultural policy
Japan's agricultural policy 4 Before the mid 1950s Japan tried hard to recover from the devastation of the Second World War, the primary emphasis of agricultural policy was directed toward increasing domestic food production and delivering them equitably at low costs to consumers. For this end, the government invested heavily in agricultural research, extension and land infrastructure and, at the same time, placed rigid controls on rice procurement from farmers and delivery to consumers under the Food Control Laws enacted during the War.
Right after the Second World War, the land reform was carried out in accordance with the strong recommendations of the occupation authorities. The urgent need to increase agricultural production by increasing production incentives to the cultivators was sufficiently strong to overcome the opposition of the landlords against strengthening of the rights of tenants 7 by controlling rents and controlling land prices. For the four years from 1947 to 1950 the government purchased 1.7 million hectares of farmland from landlords and transferred 1.9 million hectares, including state-owned land to tenant farmers, which amounted to about 80 percent of the land under tenancy before the land reform.
Although the land reform resulted in a considerable change in the distribution of landownership, the size distribution of operational holdings experienced no basic changes. As the result, the traditional agrarian structure of Japan characterized by small-scale family farms with the average size of about l hectare remained essentially unchanged, despite the rise and the fall of landlordism (see Table 2 ).
There is no doubt that the land reform promoted more equal assets and income distributions among farmers, and hence contributed to the social stability of the rural sector.
However, the reform did not induce changes in the basic direction of technological developments because the small-scale family farms continued to be the basic unit of agricultural production.
Although land reform contributed to an increase in the level of living and consumption, its contributions to capital formation and productivity growth in agriculture are not significant in terms of quantitative analysis (Kawano 1969).
As Japan set off on its 'miraculous' economic growth in the mid 1950s , agriculture began to face serious adjustment problems. In 1961 real GDP per capita in Japan exceeded $5,000, which means Japan entered the upper middle-income stage of economic development according to our stage classification.
Correspondingly, the major goal of agricultural policy shifted from the increase in the production of food staples to the reduction in the rural-urban income gap. The need for assisting agricultural 8 adjustments increased in the 1960s, as the rural-urban income gap progressively widened and the out-migration of agricultural labor accelerated. The difficulty of adjusting agriculture to the rapidly growing economy led to the enactment of the Agricultural Basic Law, a national charter for agriculture, in 1961. This Law declared that it was the government's responsibility to raise agricultural productivity and thereby close the gap in income and welfare between farm and non-farm people.
In order to raise agricultural productivity and to improve farming efficiency, it was considered essential to increase the scale of the farm operation by reducing inefficient farm units and by promoting cooperative operations among remaining farms. Despite such efforts for structural adjustment, the rate of agricultural productivity growth was not raised sufficiently to prevent the rural-urban income gap from widening further. In such a situation the Food Control System, which was originally designed to provide food security to consumers turned to become the major instrument to protect farms. Under the Food Control System based on the Food
Control Law of 1942 most food items had been placed under the direct government control.
However, as Japanese economy had recovered from the war damage, the control had been reduced so that rice alone remained under the direct control after 1952. Rice was directly controlled in its distribution. Initially, the whole marketing process of rice from producers to consumers was under direct control of the Food Agency and prices were regulated from the farm-gate to the retail level, although the regulations were relaxed gradually.
The Food Control System became a powerful instrument for rice farmers and they Protecting rice farmers through the price policy was possible because rice trade was completely controlled by the state-trading system. During the 1960s the price of rice was raised not only far above the world price but also above the market equilibrium price under autarky. In the early 1960s, Japan entered the upper middle-income stage. At that stage, Japan became able to let consumers and tax payers shoulder the costs of agricultural protection.
However, there was a limit on increasing agricultural protection by the price policy. The high prices of rice with protection resulted in expansion of rice production in the excess of consumption and in the accumulated surplus rice in government storage, which obliged the government to introduce the control on rice acreage in 1969, which has been continuing until today.
With the dramatic increase in income and wages of industrial workers after 1960, their diet rapidly changed. Indeed average compensation per industrial employee deflated by the consumer price index doubled in the 1955-70 period (and it doubled in the following decade and half again). Rice was no longer a major wage good for industrial development. Correspondingly, the Food Control System was also eroded. The direct control on rice distribution was relaxed by introducing non-government distribution channels. In 1995 finally the Food Control Law was replaced by the Staple Food Law, by which the role of the government is limited to stock holding operations of rice for food security, though the state-trading of rice is maintained for international trade.
Real GDP per capita in Japan exceeded $10,000 after 1969. As the economy advanced to the high-income stage, the demand for protection from the farm bloc increased. Japan's comparative advantage continued to shift away from agriculture to industry, while internal resistance to protectionism declined because the non-farm population became affluent and less resistant to shouldering the cost of agricultural protection in the form of high food prices or subsidies to farm producers. However, external pressures on Japan for liberalization in agricultural imports were increasing.
It was the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, by which Japan had to adjust agricultural policies to be more consistent with globalization of the economy. 
Korea's agricultural policy 5
Before 1960 in Korea the real GDP per capita was less than $1,500 and it is classified in the low-income stage of economic development. Agricultural policy adopted in this stage in Korea was to maintain low domestic prices for staple foods, notably rice and barley, and fertilizer. The
Grain Management Law, enacted in 1950, gave the government the authority to regulate the prices of staple foods. The market share of government-controlled rice was less than 10 percent during the 1950s.
The government was supposed to purchase grain directly from farmers but the government faced difficulty to make direct purchases due to budgetary constraints and spiraling grain prices under inflation in the mid 1950s. Then the schemes to collect land tax in kind and to barter fertilizer for rice were initiated. The former was successful but the latter was not because the implicit price of rice in the barter was lower than the market price.
Gain imports from the United States under Public Law 480 enabled the Korean government to keep grain prices low. Grain imports under this program amounted to 8 to 12 percent of total domestic grain production during 1956-65.
In the 1960s Korea shifted its economic policy more toward promoting industrialization, which required maintaining the prices of staple food crops low so as to keep the costs of living and wage rates low for industrial workers, rather than maintaining adequate farm income. The government purchase prices were kept below the market prices, which were considered necessary for the purpose of increasing industrial profits and capital formation. These were typical of agriculture-taxing policies commonly observed at the low-income stage of development.
The real GDP per capita in Korea exceeded $1,500 in 1961 and Korean economy entered the lower middle-income stage, which lasted till the early 1980s when Korean per capita real GDP became more than $5,000. In this stage Korean government price intervention became more intense. The market share of government-controlled rice was expanded to 20-25 percent during the 1960s. In the early 1970s, the buffer-stock operation for non-cereal products was set in motion, and pesticides and farm machinery were added to the list of subsidized inputs. The government's purchase prices for rice and barley had been steadily raised with the aim of increasing food production as well as reducing the urban-rural income gap. Although the government raised the producer prices for staple food grains, it did so without a comparable rise in the market prices of rice and barley in order to prevent the cost of living and the wage rate of industrial workers from rising.
The implementation of the two-price system, however, conflicted with financial and monetary stability. As the difference between the purchase and selling prices of rice and barley widened, the financial losses of the grain management fund increased. Since a large portion of this deficit was financed by long-term overdrafts from the Bank of Korea, this policy became a major factor to increase money supply and cause inflation. Expansion of the government deficit due to the two-price policy became a serious constraint to the policy.
Entering the upper middle-income stage in the 1980s with more than $5,000 of the real GDP per capita, the Korean government took a step toward reducing both tariff and non-tariff protection for manufacturing industries. In contrast, the agricultural policies were strengthened toward protecting agriculture sector. The producer prices of farm products were increased to the levels that were far above border prices and for the most agricultural commodities the quantitative import restrictions were maintained.
Korea entered the high-income stage in the early 1990s. Thereafter, significant policy changes on Korean agriculture were mostly related to WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) stipulated in 1995. According to the provisions of the AoA, all measures of quantitative restrictions were converted into tariffs for all agricultural products except for rice in Korea. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, Korea obtained the status of developing country for which special treatments were given in implementing the commitment to reduce border protection. The agricultural products under the tariffication were subject to protection reduction commitment by 24 percent on average within ten years with the minimum cut of 10 percent. Tariff rates of Korean agricultural products were as high as over 60 percent on average. Tariffs for the products which were considered particularly important in Korea were cut by the minimum rate of 10 percent.
In addition, imports of many agricultural products began under the minimum market access (MA) commitment. This requires that of all agricultural products at least 3 percent of consumption must be purchased from overseas in the first year and the import share must increase annually up to 5 percent of consumption in 10 years. Low tariff rates are applied to the in-quota volume so as to guarantee easy market access from exporting countries. Many key agricultural products such as rice, barley, orange, red pepper, garlic, onion newly began to be imported under this MA commitment.
Rice is an important item for Korean agriculture and was temporarily exempted from the tariffication as provided in Annex 5.B of the AoA. As an exception, rice was subject to import Approximately one-third went to agriculture, which was used to build infrastructure and foster human resources for agriculture. Also, substantial imports of U.S. aid-financed commodities and increases in domestic production, especially of food, helped relieve the pressure on demand.
In the low-income stage of development before 1960, agricultural policy in Taiwan aimed mainly to supply rice at low stable prices to non-farm population. In those days two important taxes were imposed on Taiwan's farmers; the farm land tax and the hidden rice tax by means of compulsory purchases and the rice-fertilizer barter system. The compulsory purchase of paddy from landowners at official prices was another source of government-controlled rice.
All the paddy lands were subject to the paddy land tax plus the compulsory procurement of rice.
The compulsory procurement was assessed on the basis of tax units determined with land productivity. The difference between the government procurement prices and farmers' market prices constituted a hidden tax on the paddy landowners who are mostly farm operators after the implementation of land reform program. The difference, however, was abolished in 1973 in order to increase farm incomes.
The government's rice collection by all of these methods averaged 50 percent to 60 percent of the total amount of rice produced minus farmers' home consumption during 1950-70.
By 1973, however, this share had declined to 20 percent. In subsequent years it increased again because of the guaranteed rice price policy. The total of this hidden rice tax was larger than
14
Taiwan's total income tax before1963 and was more than twice the farm land tax before 1961, except in 1954.
After 1969 when Taiwan moved to the lower middle-income stage, the hidden rice tax decreased rapidly. The ratio of the hidden rice tax to the total income tax dropped to only 8.5 percent in 1971 (Kuo 1975) . Thus, the agricultural policy geared to exploit agriculture for the sake of supporting industrial development (and military development) largely ended during the 1970s.
In the 1970s, the shift from taxing to subsidizing agriculture began. However, at the same time Taiwan rapidly expanded production on light industrial commodities in response to increases in export demand. Because many light industries such as garments and foot-wears were located in rural areas, nonagricultural income became increasingly more important to farmers.
Taiwan farmers were able to take advantage of employment in manufacturing without leaving home and many of them engaged in non-farm activities in off-farm seasons. Therefore, the need for them to rely on agricultural protection policies was relatively small.
It was 1978 when Taiwan entered the upper middle-income stage with its real GDP per capita exceeding $5,000. Still, to help equalize farm income with that of the rapidly expanding industrial sector, the government offered loans and subsidies for promoting farm mechanization, which was hoped to raise farmers' labor productivity.
At this time the growth of rice production began to slow down in response to an increased emphasis on livestock and fishery products and high-value export crops. Increases in industrial employment also were pushing up the costs of farm labor. Labor productivity in agriculture continued to lag behind that in the industrial sector, and the gap between farm and non-farm per capita incomes was increasing, especially for farmers relied on rice production. These problems faced by Taiwan agriculture were similar to those that many other industrial countries experienced at a comparable development stage in the past, especially Japan in the early 1960
and Korea in the late 1970s .
Per capita consumption of rice fell from 140 kilograms per year in 1968 to 74 kilograms in1988. Correspondingly, the accumulation of rice stock became a serious problem. In order to reduce production, farm extension workers encouraged farmers to plant other crops in rice fields, but their efforts were not successful because no economic incentive was provided. A six-year rice-crop substitution plan inaugurated in 1984 gave direct subsidies of 1 metric ton of paddy rice per hectare to farmers who shifted their rice fields to corn or sorghum, or 1.5 metric tons of paddy rice per hectare to farmers who shifted to crops other than corn and sorghum. In addition, corn and sorghum were to be purchased by the government at guaranteed prices. Under the program, rice production declined to 1.84 million metric tons in 1988, which was smaller by 0.9 million metric ton than the peak of 1976. The paid-in-kind subsidy was changed to a cash payment in 1988 to improve efficiency in the management of the program. Of the 41 products that were under import quota restrictions before accession, 18 were moved to tariffication after the WTO accession. Rice received a special treatment and the remaining 22 items to be governed by the tariff-rate quota regimes.
The special treatment on rice is based on the rules of Annex V of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture by which the quota of rice imports was set to be 8 percent in 2002 of the average domestic consumption between 1990 and 1992, i.e. 144,720 tons of brown rice. By negotiation, this amount was divided into governmental and private import quotas. The government quota rice (65 percent of the rice import) must be subject to the same treatment as with the rice purchased from the local growers. The imported rice cannot be exported for food aid nor can be used for animal feed.
The remaining (35 percent) shall be imported by private firms and will be allocated on first-come-first-serve basis. For both private and government quotas, there is a ceiling of price mark-up of NT$23.26 per kilogram for rice and NT$25.59 for rice products when they are sold on the domestic market. If the sale of quota rice is slow, the price mark-up can be cut by NT$3 for every two weeks. The mark-up reduction can be continued until all of the quantities are sold out.
Measurement of distortions to agricultural incentives
Measures of distortions
Distortions are defined as the effects of governments' interventions into the market to create gaps between marginal social returns to sellers and marginal social costs to buyers in market transactions. To measure such distortions, there are several approaches. We use the most common measure that is ad valorem tax on competing imports. If the tariff on the imported primary agricultural product is the only distortion policy, its effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to farm output, which is the unit value of production at the distorted price minus its value at the undistorted free market price expressed as a fraction of the undistorted price.
However, it is not only the tariff that distorts agricultural incentives but also there are many other distortion policies including non-tariff barriers. It is conventional to measure the direct trade or price policy-induced distortions to incentives with domestic-to-border price comparisons for traded goods. In practice, there are also divergences across farmer, processor, consumer and border prices for reasons other than subsidies or taxes on production, consumption, trade or foreign currency. These shall be recognized when using comparisons of domestic and border prices to derive estimates of distortions. Therefore, NRA is measured as the difference between the domestic wholesale price of a domestic product and the import c.i.f. or export f.o.b. price of the same kind.
Commodities covered in the calculation for NRA include rice, wheat, barley, beef, pork, chicken, eggs, and milk for Japan and Korea. Covered for Taiwan are rice, wheat, beef, pork, chicken, and eggs. NRA is calculated for each commodity as a ratio of difference of domestic wholesale price from border price (c.i.f. unit value) divided by border price. The domestic prices are converted to US dollars using market rates of foreign exchange rates. Then the average rate of NRA over the commodities for county is calculated using the weights of domestic production of commodities valued at border prices.
The coverage of the commodities in this study is about 60 percent in the value of production in each economy. It is difficult to judge the levels of NRA for other commodities not covered in this study. As an easy treatment, it is assumed that the other commodities are not directly distorted by the government. In this treatment, the direct rate of assistance to the whole agricultural sector (DRA) is estimated in multiplying the weighted average NRA by the share of the products under the calculation in the total value of agricultural production. Thus, the estimated DRA is considered the lower limit of the real DRA.
In addition to direct assistance to farmers, their incentives are also affected if the nominal direct rate of assistance to non-agricultural production (DRN) in the national economy is non-zero. The higher is DRN, the more other sectors will have bid up the value of mobile resources that would otherwise have been employed in agriculture. If the average DRA for agriculture is below the average for all non-agricultural sectors, DRN, then one would expect that fewer resources are used in agriculture than those used under free market conditions in this country and conversely if agriculture's DRA is above DRN.
To take into account the DRN, trade weighted tariffs of non-primary commodities are used to estimate the total rate of assistance in the agricultural sector as a whole (TRA). TRA is DRA minus DRN. The weighted tariffs are available in only selected years for Korea and Taiwan so that the tariff rates are linearly interpolated for the years between those for which the data are available. For early years the tariff rates are estimated with the real average tariff rates obtained with total tariff revenue divided by value of imports, assuming it to move parallel with the weighted average of tariffs for non-primary commodities.
The weighted average tariff is corrected with the share of tradable goods to obtain DRN.
Actually, the share of non-service sector in the non-agricultural GDP is multiplied by the weighed tariff, assuming that only service sector is non-tradable. Finally TRA is calculated by subtracting DRN from DRA.
Estimation results
The results of estimated TRA for Japan, Korea and Taiwan since 1961 are shown in Figure 1 , while all the estimates of NRA, DRA, DRN, and TRA are detailed in Appendix Table. Japan's TRA was already 30-40 percent in the 1960s when Japan was already in the upper middle-income stage of economic development. However, TRAs for Korea and Taiwan, both in the lower middle-income stage, were at a very low level, involving negative rates for some years before the mid 1970s. Japan increased its TRA steadily over time except the period of the "World Food Crises" in the mid 1970s.
Japan entered the high-income stage in the 1970s and increased its TRA, reaching a peak in 1994, though it was the year followed by bad rice harvest recording 26 percent less than the regular season. Japan's TRA was rather stable in a range of 100-110 percent after the mid 1980s.
Korea began the rapid growth of agricultural assistance in the late 1970s when Korea was shifting from the lower to the upper middle-income stage. Korea was soon followed by Taiwan The movements in NRAF at the farm gate were parallel to those in TRA at the wholesale level in the 1980s though the fluctuations in the former are smaller than that of the latter, implying that changes in the wholesale price are not perfectly transmitted to the farm gate. In the 1990s when all the three economies entered the high-income economies, however, the differences between the TRA and the NRAF widened particular in Taiwan. This might mean that distortions are increasing all in the three economies but the share of institutional rent accruing to the distribution and handling sectors increased particularly in Taiwan. It might also reflect the fact that value added by marketing and processing activities, whose roles are getting more important in the high-income stage, increased relative to value added at farms, especially for livestock products.
The degree of distortions was still in rising trends for Japan, Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s to the early 1990s. But, thereafter, as far as NRAF is concerned, their trends seem to differ slightly. In Korea assistance to farmers as measured by NRAF has continued rising, whereas it has slightly decelerated in Japan and Taiwan since the late 1990s. It is also noted that the outbreak of the foot-mouth disease on hogs in 1997 in Taiwan increased the farm gate price more than the wholesale price relative to the border price, which may explain the sharper decline in NRAF than that of TRA.
It is particularly important to see the relationship between fluctuations in TRA and changes in exchange rate because it shows the degree of transmission of world market prices to the domestic prices. Namely, if the border protection measures are only tariffs, TRA is not affected by changes in exchange rate because border price changes due to exchange rate changes are fully transmitted to domestic markets. But, if the protection is based on non-tariff barriers, such as prohibitively high tariffs and tariff rate quotas, TRA tends to move in the same directions as the exchange rate change does.
The relationships of TRA and exchange rate changes are shown in 3 for Japan, Figure 4 for Korea and Figure 5 for Taiwan. It is clear that Japan's TRA are positively correlated with the exchange rate, reflecting continued heavily dependence on non-tariff barriers. In Korea the movements of TRA and the exchange rate were negatively correlated until the mid 1980s, which should have resulted from increases in domestic agricultural prices at faster rates than the rates of exchange rate depreciations, particularly in the 1980s when Korea was in the upper middle-income stage, though they became rather parallel in the late 1990s. Movements of TRA in Taiwan were largely parallel with those of the exchange rate.
These observations imply that tariffs are not the very appropriate indicators of border protection level. Although all the non-tariff barriers have been converted to tariffs following the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in 1995, many tariffs contain the so called "water" meaning that 20 the tariffs are greater than the price differences between domestic and border prices. Especially, the secondary tariffs in tariff rate quotas (TRQ) are extremely high. The existence of these "dirty tariffs" led current WTO negotiations on agriculture to propose capping tariffs in harmonization of tariff peaks.
Fluctuations in TRA consist of mainly changes in NRA of individual commodities and changes in the weight of each commodity. Same for Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the most important agricultural product is rice. Its protection therefore has had large influences on TRA.
The movements of NRA for rice in the three economies are shown in Figure 6 . The NRA of rice has a clear upward trend in all three economies. In particular, Japan increased NRA for rice sharply in the late 1980s and 1990s. Sharp increases in rice NRA in the late 1980s to a peak in 1987 resulted from rapid depreciations of US dollar by which the border price of rice declined sharply. But the border price declines were not transmitted into Japanese rice market under the perfect control of rice imports by the government. Another peak of rice NRA in Japan was caused by bad harvests of rice in 1993 resulting in the shortage of Japonica rice in world market that raised border prices, while domestic prices were kept relatively stable under the Food Control System.
In Korean and Taiwan, NRA for rice stayed at almost zero before the late 1970s when both economies were in the lower middle-income stage. Thereafter it showed a clear rising trend.
Increases in NRA of Korean rice are considered a major factor underlying the high growth rate of the TRA. In Korea, the weight of rice in agricultural production is still high so that the trend of assistance to rice continues to be a major determinant on the trend of the total assistance to agriculture. Korea started to protect rice sector in the late 1970s and increased the NRA of rice steadily thereafter. As discussed in the previous section, Korea was exempted from tariffication dictated by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. This treatment allows the NRA to grow even after the implementation of the WTO commitments.
It is interesting to see that Taiwan lagged about five years behind Korea in the growth of NRA for rice. The gap in NRA for rice between Taiwan and Korea has widened in recent yeas.
Still, the protection level of rice in Taiwan has been rising. Indeed, Taiwan became a member of WTO in 2002 but tariffication of rice was exempted.
Sources of agricultural protection growth
Among past studies on agricultural protection in East Asia, Anderson, Hayami and Honma (1986) pointed three characteristics of East Asian growth of agricultural protection, based on the estimated the nominal rates of protection (NRP) for agricultural products in Japan, Korea, Taiwan in comparison with other economies from 1955 to 1980.
First was the rapid rise over time in protection rates in the three economies in East Asia.
Second was the much faster increase in agricultural protection in East Asia than other industrial countries for the period of 1955 to 1980. Third was the highest level of agricultural protection that the three economies reached as of 1980, which was rivaled only by Switzerland.
The experience of these three economies in East Asia shows a good example of policy switching from exploitation to protection of agriculture when economies grow based on industrial development. This shift is most clearly illustrated by the cases of Korea and Taiwan whose agricultural protection levels were negative in the 1950s and the 1960s and began the rise sharply from the 1970s with the success of industrial development.
In Anderson, Hayami and Honma (1986) , the growth of agricultural protection in those economies during the three decades up to 1980 was found to be exceptionally rapid, compared with the earlier starters of industrialization in the West. East Asia was not exceptional in its bent forward agricultural protection in the course of successful industrial development but exceptional in its speed in reaching the world highest level. Figure 1 indicates that the protection growth in terms of TRA continued at the same speed for 20 years after the previous study period.
The rapid growth of agricultural protection was largely explained by the shift in comparative advantage away from agriculture to industry as the result of successful industrialization. The decline in agriculture's comparative advantage increases the inter-sectoral resource adjustment costs that have to be shouldered by farmers if left to the competitive market mechanism and, hence, increases their demand for agricultural protection. This typically applies to East Asia where the industrial growth has been exceptionally rapid so that inter-sectoral 22 adjustments at a sufficient scale to prevent rural-urban income disparity from widening have been more difficult to achieve under the free market. However, it is observed that there are differences in the process of the inter-sectoral resource adjustment between Japan and other two economies. In 1955, the first year for our investigation, Japan was already in the middle-income stage of economic development and entering the so-called "High Growth Era" characterized by extremely rapid industrialization, associated with the widening income gap between rural and urban households. Japan introduced protection measures for agriculture soon after it entered the High Growth Era through which Japan was able to jump up from a middle-income to a high-income economy by 1970 within less than two decades. Correspondingly, Japan's agricultural protection was raised to a level comparable with that of the European Community already during the 1960s.
Meanwhile, Korea and Taiwan stayed in the low-income stage in economic development in the 1950s. But they entered in a middle-income stage soon in the 1960s. In the-middle income stage, productivity growth in agriculture tends to lag behind that in non-agriculture as a result of the successful industrialization. Therefore, farmers' income level tends to decline relative to non-farmers' corresponding to the widening inter-sectoral productivity gap. Nevertheless, it is impossible for the government in the middle-income stage to secure sufficient finance for closing the income gap since the shares of agriculture in both national income and labor force still remain large. Thus, Korea and Taiwan remained at a low level of agricultural protection despite growing rural-urban income disparity until the late 1970s or the early 1980s, respectively.
The agricultural problem in the middle-income economies like Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s is called the "disparity problem" It is by nature the problem of income disparity between the farm and the non-farm sectors. 9 This problem is brought about by a lag in productivity growth in agriculture behind non-agriculture as a result of the successful industrialization that raised these economies to a middle-income stage. At this stage as compared with the previous low-income stage, the food supply capacity rises and factors causing growth in demand for foods, such as high population growth and high demand elasticities, are weakened, though people's per-capita incomes do not yet reach a level at which food consumption is completely saturated as in the high-income economies. As a result, the terms of trade between agriculture and non-agriculture remain largely stable, despite significant decreases in agriculture's productivity relative to non-agriculture due to rapid progress in industrialization. Therefore, farmers' income level tends to decline relative to non-farmers' corresponding to the widening inter-sectoral productivity gap. By observing non-farm workers' rapid escape from poverty, farmers who are left behind begin to realize how poor they are, even if their income level did not decrease or modestly increased from the previous stage. Dissatisfaction of farm population on their remaining to be poor despite visible improvements in other sectors often becomes a significant source of social instability. Thus, at the middle-income stage, it becomes a prime concern of policymakers to prevent rural-urban income disparity from widening.
So, the government tries to adopt agricultural protection measures to appease farmers' dissatisfaction that may elevate to serious anti-governmental movements. However, this
protection cannot be strong enough to fill up the income gap between farmers and urban workers unlike in the high-income stage. Because the shares of agriculture in both national income and labor force are still large, it is difficult for the government in the middle-income stage to raise sufficient revenue from the non-farm sectors to subsidize farm population for closing the growing farm-nonfarm income gap.
It is also difficult to pass on the cost of agricultural protection by means of raising domestic food prices because increases in food prices result in a major damage to a large number 24 of small-scale enterprises in urban area, which heavily rely on cheap labor. Under the dictate of this disparity problem, policymakers in middle-income countries are forced to muddle around in search of ways and means to protect farmers within the constraint of the food problem that is still binding because a large number of workers in urban informal sectors are still absolutely poor.
Since the early 1990s when all the three economies entered the high-income stage, declines in the relative agricultural income in terms of agricultural GDP per worker divided by total GDP per worker stopped in Japan and Korea whereas in Taiwan the relative agricultural income continued to decline till recently, as observed in Table 1 (Row 5), in spite of the high level of agricultural protection. The reason why Taiwan's relative agricultural income continued to decline is that Taiwan increased its total economy's labor productivity more rapidly than agriculture's labor productivity even after 1990.
In Japan the decline in the relative agricultural income ceased in the 1970s when Japan reached at the high-income stage. It was due to deceleration in the growth of labor productivity in whole economy after the completion of its catch-up stage, whereas that of Korea after 1990 is likely to be explained by fast increases in agricultural labor productivity resulting from the rapid out-migration of agricultural labor to urban industry as seen in Table 1 This problem is now spreading over Asia from ASEAN nations to China and Vietnam and will eventually reach South Asia, especially India.
Furthermore, attention should be paid also to changes in the structure of political economy. In the analysis by Honma and Hayami (1986) , it was found that the political power in agricultural sector would be maximized when the share of agriculture is declining to 4 to 5 percent in GDP or 5 to 8 percent in labor force. Japan passed already in this range, whereas Korea in both of GDP and labor force and Taiwan in labor force have recently entered this peak zone. This may well be the factors to underlie the rise of agricultural protectionism in Korea in recent years, observed in terms of NRA at farm-gate level, despite no significant decrease in agriculture's comparative advantage.
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Concluding remarks
This article examined the degree of distortions to agricultural incentives in terms of price distortions in Japan, Korea and Taiwan The agricultural problem in the middle-income economies is based on what we call the "disparity problem". Greater attention shall be paid on this problem. The difficulty to solve this problem is how to compromise the conflicting needs to support farmers' incomes on one hand and to secure the supply of low-cost food to a large number of workers in urban informal sectors in another, under the still weak capacity of the government to raise sufficient revenue from non-agricultural sectors. Somewhat contrasting patterns of agricultural and industrial growth between Korea and Taiwan may provide a key to the solution, on which further research inputs shall be called for. Table2. Changes in Agricultural Structure in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1955 -2004 1955 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 TRA,% 
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